Footnotes

  (1)

L.J.J. Wittgenstein, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung: Kritische Edition, ed. by B.F. McGuinness and J. Schulte, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1989. Henceforth referred to as `TLP'.

  (2)

Wittgenstein uses the word `Seele'. As S.A. Kripke notes in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1982, pp. 49 and 127, `mind' is often a better translation of this word than `soul' because it has less religious and philosophical connotations. Since most readers of the English version of the Tractatus will be accustomed to the translation `soul', we will use the latter term.

  (3)

For example, J. Hintikka, `On Wittgenstein's "Solipsism"', Mind 67 (1958), 88-91, and M. Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein's `Tractatus', Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell U.P., 1964, p. 301.

  (4)

K.J. Perszyk, `Tractatus 5.54-5.5422', Philosophia 17 (1987), 111-126, quotation from p. 117.

  (5)

G.E.M. Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 4th ed., London, Hutchinson, 1971, p. 88. J. Hintikka and B. Wolniewicz, personal communications, 1989.

  (6)

P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, 2nd ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 62.

  (7)

H. Sluga, `Subjectivity in the Tractatus', Synthese 56 (1983), 123-139, quotation from pp. 129-130.

  (8)

Kripke, op. cit., p. 131.

  (9)

J.O. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, Oxford, Blackwell, 1956, p. 133.

  (10)

J. Rosenberg, `Intentionality and Self in the Tractatus', Noûs 2 (1969), 341-358, quotation from p. 342.

  (11)

Letter to Russell dated 19.8.19, reprinted in L.J.J. Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916, edited by G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe, 2nd ed., Oxford, Blackwell, 1979, p. 131.

  (12)

G.J.C. Lokhorst, `Ontology, Semantics and Philosophy of Mind in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: a Formal Reconstruction', Erkenntnis 29 (1988), 35-75, and `Truth-functionality and Supervenience in the Tractatus', in P. Weingartner and G. Schurz, eds., Reports of the 13th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, Vienna, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1989, 276-278.

  (13)

O. Weininger, Geschlecht und Charakter: Eine prinzipielle Untersuchung, Vienna and Leipzig, Braumüller, 1926, Part II, Chaps. 6-9.

  (14)

See, e.g., Sluga, op. cit. The remark in TLP 5.1362 that "`A knows that p is the case" is senseless when p is a tautology' may also be an echo from Weininger. He wrote that a tautology does not express knowledge and cannot be the object of an act of thought (ibid., part II, ch. 7).

  (15)

Notebooks, op. cit., p. 119.

  (16)

Sluga, op. cit., pp. 129-130.

  (17)

See, for example, A. Kenny, `Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy of Mind', in I. Block, ed., Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Oxford, Blackwell, 1981, 140-147.

  (18)

L.J.J. Wittgenstein, Blue Book, pp. 73-74, in The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford, Blackwell, 1958.

  (19)

W. James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, New York, Henry Holt, 1890, p. 365. In addition to `Ego', James also uses the terms `Transcendental Subject' and `Self'.

  (20)

The latter expressions come from the Blue Book, op. cit., p. 47.

  (21)

The expression `geometrical eye' comes from the Blue Book, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

  (22)

M.U. Coyne, `Eye, "I", and Mine: The Self of Wittgenstein's Tractatus', Southern Journal of Philosophy 20, 1982, 313-323, quotation from p. 317.

  (23)

Coyne (op. cit.) has no difficuly with TLP 5.632 because she regards the eye as the limit of the visual field and the I as the limit of reality. We say that the eye and I are only elements of these limits (namely, their vertices). We prefer our own interpretation because we do not see how one can make sense of Coyne's talk about the `shapes' of the visual field and reality if these shapes are assumed to be bounded by points. How could a point delimit a shape?

  (24)

L.J.J. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, ed. by R. Rhees, Oxford, Blackwell, 1964, §71.

  (25)

G.E. Moore, `Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33', in his Philosophical Papers, London, Allen and Unwin, 1959, 252-324, quotation from p. 309. Wittgenstein may have got the Lichtenberg quotation from Weininger, op. cit., part II, ch. 7.

  (26)

A similar critique applies to Dewan's proposal to regard the mind as a virtual governor of the brain of the same type as the virtual governors which are defined over grids of electrical generators. The idea is useful in electrical engineering, but does not have any explanatory value in the philosophy of mind. See E.M. Dewan, `Consciousness as an Emergent Causal Agent in the Context of Control System Theory', in G.G. Globus, G. Maxwell and I. Savodnik, eds., Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry, New York, Plenum Press, 1976, 181-198.

  (27)

Compare Hintikka, op. cit. (1958).

  (28)

`Ich kann mir nichts ausser meinem Denken denken; denn dadurch, dass ich es denke, wird es ja mein Denken, und fällt unter die unvermeidliche Gesetze desselben.' (`I can't think anything which goes beyond my thinking; for the very fact that I am thinking it turns it into my thinking, and makes it fall under the inevitable laws of thinking.') Wittgenstein? No, J.G. Fichte, Die Bestimmung des Menschen, Berlin, Voss, 1800, p. 157.

  (29)

Hacker, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

  (30)

Quoted without reference by J. Hadamard, The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field, 2nd ed., Princeton, N.J., Princeton U.P., 1949, p. 68.

  (31)

I am ignoring the philosophers who have proclaimed themselves to be the philosophers of modern cognitive science (Fodor, Pylyshyn and the like). First, cognitive scientists themselves are usually bewildered by the claims these philosophers make on their behalf, and secondly, this kind of philosophy is rapidly dying out anyway (cf. the last footnote below).

  (32)

A good account of Hertz's influence on the picture-theory may be found in J. Griffin, Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism, Oxford, Oxford U.P., 1964.

  (33)

The `Boltzmann machine' is a device composed of simple elements analogous to neurons whose collective behaviour is described by the laws of statistical mechanics. It is able to make `dynamical internal models' of the statistical structure of its environment which exactly conform to the definition H. Hertz gave of such models in his Die Prinzipien der Mechanik in neuem Zusammenhange dargestellt, Leipzig, Barth, 1894. See, e.g., D.H. Ackley, G.E. Hinton and T.J. Sejnowski, `A Learning Algorithm for Boltzmann machines', Cognitive Science 9, 1985, 147-169, repr. in J.A. Anderson and E. Rosenfeld, eds., Neurocomputing: Foundations of Research, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1988, 638-649. This anthology contains many more examples of non-sentential psychological models of a `Hertzian' kind.

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