Publications in English

Most publications are available on-line.

PhD Thesis

  [A1]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Logical Explorations in the Philosophy of Mind: Essays on Aristotle's Psychology, Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and Lévy-Bruhl's Logical Relativism. PhD thesis, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, 1992. 173 pp. Available on-line

Abstract. In this doctoral dissertation, three topics from the philosophy of mind (Aristotle's account of reflective awareness, Wittgenstein's early philosophy of mind, and Lévy-Bruhl's thesis of logical relativism) are clarified with the help of modern epistemic, modal and perceptual logic.

Papers in Refereed Journals

  [B33]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. An alternative intuitionistic version of Mally's deontic logic. Reports on Mathematical Logic, 51: 35-41, 2016. ISSN 0137-2904. 10.4467/20842589RM.16.003.5280. Available on-line

Abstract. Some years ago, Lokhorst proposed an intuitionistic reformulation of Mally's deontic logic (1926). This reformulation was unsatisfactory, because it provided a striking theorem that Mally himself did not mention. In this paper, we present an alternative reformulation of Mally's deontic logic that does not provide this theorem.

  [B32]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Mally's deontic logic: Reducibility and semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 44: 309-319, 2015. ISSN 0022-3611. 10.1007/s10992-014-9320-z. Review. Available on-line

Abstract. We discuss three aspects of the intuitionistic reformulation of Mally's deontic logic that was recently proposed (Journal of Philosophical Logic (2013) 42:635-641). First, this reformulation is more similar to Standard Deontic Logic than appears at first sight: like Standard Deontic Logic, it is Kanger reducible and Anderson reducible to alethic logic and it has a semantical interpretation that can be read in deontic terms. Second, this reformulation has an extension that provides 100% of the theorems stated by Mally himself (and that does not provide O A -> A, which Mally himself did not state either). Third, it is interesting to view Mally's original deontic logic as an extension of this reformulation.

  [B31]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Neuroscience and human rights. Nova Acta Leopoldina, NF 119 (403): 103-105, 2014. Available on-line
  [B30]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. An intuitionistic reformulation of Mally's deontic logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 42: 635-641, 2013. ISSN 0022-3611. 10.1007/s10992-012-9242-6. Available on-line

Abstract. In 1926, Ernst Mally proposed a number of deontic postulates. He added them as axioms to classical propositional logic. The resulting system was unsatisfactory because it had the consequence that A is the case if and only if it is obligatory that A. We present an intuitionistic reformulation of Mally's deontic logic. We show that this system does not provide the just-mentioned objectionable theorem while most of the theorems that Mally considered acceptable are still derivable. The resulting system is unacceptable as a deontic logic, but it does make sense as a lax logic in the modern sense of the word.

  [B29]
M. J. van den Hoven, G.J.C. Lokhorst, & I. van de Poel. Engineering and the problem of moral overload. Science and Engineering Ethics, pp. 1-13, 2011. ISSN 1353-3452. 10.1007/s11948-011-9277-z. Available on-line
  [B28]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Computational meta-ethics: Towards the meta-ethical robot. Minds and machines, 21: 261-274, 2011. ISSN 0924-6495. 10.1007/s11023-011-9229-z. Available on-line
  [B27]
Nicole Vincent, Pim Haselager, & Gert-Jan Lokhorst. The neuroscience of responsibility--workshop report. Neuroethics, pp. 1-4, 2010. ISSN 1874-5490. 10.1007/s12152-010-9078-0. Available on-line

Abstract. This is a report on the 3-day workshop The Neuroscience of Responsibility that was held in the Philosophy Department at Delft University of Technology in The Netherlands during February 11th-13th, 2010. The workshop had 25 participants from The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, UK, USA, Canada and Australia, with expertise in philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry and law. Its aim was to identify current trends in neurolaw research related specifically to the topic of responsibility, and to foster international collaborative research on this topic. The workshop agenda was constructed by the participants at the start of each day by surveying the topics of greatest interest and relevance to participants. In what follows, we summarize (1) the questions which participants identified as most important for future research in this field, (2) the most prominent themes that emerged from the discussions, and (3) the two main international collaborative research project plans that came out of this meeting.

  [B26]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Where did Mally go wrong? In G. Governatori & G. Sartor, eds., DEON 2010, vol. 6181 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI), pp. 247-258. Springer-Verlag, Berlin and Heidelberg, 2010. ISBN 978-3-642-14182-9. ISSN 0302-9743. Available on-line

Abstract. In 1926, Ernst Mally proposed the first system of deontic logic. His system turned out to be unacceptable. How can it be repaired? We discuss several proposals to reformulate it in terms of strict implication, relevant implication and strict relevant implication.

  [B25]
M. P. M. Franssen, G.J.C. Lokhorst, & I. van de Poel. Philosophy of technology. In Edward N. Zalta, ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Metaphysics Research Lab at the Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 2009. ISSN 1095-5054.
  [B24]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Anderson's relevant deontic and eubouliatic systems. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 49 (1): 65-73, 2008. ISSN 0029-4527. Available on-line

Abstract. We present axiomatizations of the deontic fragment of Anderson's relevant deontic logic (the logic of obligation and related concepts) and the eubouliatic fragment of Anderson's eubouliatic logic (the logic of prudence, safety, risk, and related concepts).

  [B23]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Propositional quantifiers in deontic logic. In L. Goble & J.-J.C. Meyer, eds., DEON 2006, vol. 4048 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI), pp. 201-209. Springer-Verlag, Berlin and Heidelberg, 2006. ISSN 0302-9743. Superseded by [B22].

Abstract. Several systems of monadic deontic logic are defined in terms of systems of alethic modal logic with a propositional constant. When the universal propositional quantifier is added to these systems, the propositional constant becomes definable in terms of the deontic operator. As a result, the meaning of this constant becomes clearer and it becomes easy to axiomatize the deontic fragments of the alethic modal systems.

  [B22]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Andersonian deontic logic, propositional quantification, and Mally. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 47 (3): 385-395, 2006. ISSN 0029-4527. Available on-line
  [B21]
V. Wiegel, M. J. van den Hoven, & G.J.C. Lokhorst. Privacy, deontic epistemic action logic and software agents: An executable approach to modeling moral constraints in complex informational relationships. Ethics and Information Technology, 7 (4): 251-264, 2005. ISSN 1388-1957 (Paper) 1572-8439 (Online).
  [B20]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Descartes and the pineal gland. In Edward N. Zalta, ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Metaphysics Research Lab at the Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 2005. ISSN 1095-5054. Available on-line
  [B19]
M. J. L. Degenaar & G.J.C. Lokhorst. Molyneux's problem. In Edward N. Zalta, ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Metaphysics Research Lab at the Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 2005. ISSN 1095-5054. Available on-line
  [B18]
G.J.C. Lokhorst & Lou Goble. Mally's deontic logic. Grazer philosophische Studien, 67: 37-57, 2004. ISSN 0165-9227. Available on-line

Abstract. In 1926, Mally presented the first formal system of deontic logic. His system had several consequences which Mally regarded as surprising but defensible. It also, however, has the consequence that A is obligatory if and only if A is the case, which is unacceptable from the point of view of any reasonable deontic logic. We describe Mally's system and discuss how it might reasonably be repaired.

  [B17]
M. J. van den Hoven & G.J.C. Lokhorst. Deontic logic and computer-supported computer ethics. Metaphilosophy, 33 (3): 376-386, 2002. ISSN 0026-1068. Available on-line

Abstract. We provide a description and informal analysis of the commonalities in moral discourse concerning issues in the field of information and communications technology, present a logic model (DEAL) of this type of moral discourse which makes use of recent research in deontic, epistemic and action logic, and indicate--drawing upon recent research in computer implementations of modal logic--how information systems may be developed that implement the proposed formalization.

  [B16]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Mally's deontic logic. In Edward N. Zalta, ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Metaphysics Research Lab at the Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 2002. ISSN 1095-5054. With computer program. Available on-line

Abstract. In 1926, Mally presented the first formal system of deontic logic. His system had several consequences which Mally regarded as surprising but defensible. It also had a consequence (A is obligatory if and only if A is the case) which Menger (1939) and almost all later deontic logicians have regarded as unacceptable. We give an exposition of Mally's system and discuss how it may be repaired.

  [B15]
G.J.C. Lokhorst & Timo T. Kaitaro. The originality of Descartes' theory about the pineal gland. Journal for the History of the Neurosciences, 10 (1): 6-18, 2001. ISSN 0964-704X. Available on-line

Abstract. René Descartes thought that the pineal gland is the part of the body with which the soul is most immediately associated. Several prominent historians (such as Soury, Thorndike and Sherrington) have claimed that this idea was not very original. We re-examine the evidence and conclude that their assessment was wrong. We pay special attention to the thesis about the pineal gland which Jean Cousin defended in January, 1641.

  [B14]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Ernst Mally's Deontik (1926). Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 40 (2): 273-282, 1999 (2001). ISSN 0029-4527. Superseded by [B16]. Available on-line

Abstract. In 1926, Ernst Mally proposed the first formal deontic system. As Mally and others soon realized, this system had some rather strange consequences. We show that the strangeness of Mally's system is not so much due to his informal deontic principles as to the fact that he formalized those principles in terms of the propositional calculus. If they are formalized in terms of relevant logic rather than classical logic, one obtains a system which is related to Anderson's relevant deontic logic and not nearly as strange as Mally's own system.

  [B13]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Geach's deontic quantifier. Philosophia, 27 (1-2): 247-251, 1999. ISSN 0048-3893. Available on-line

Abstract. We show that Peter Geach's ideas on deontic quantification or deontic abstraction (Philosophia 11 (1981) 1-12) pose no threat to the standard modal approach to deontic logic. They can very well be represented within the framework of a standard quantified deontic system equipped with an alethic abstraction operator.

  [B12]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. The logic of logical relativism. Logique et Analyse, 41 (162-162-163): 57-65, 1998 (2001). ISSN 0024-5836. Available on-line

Abstract. We explicate the thesis of logical relativism (people of different cultures may have different logics) in logical terms. Our illustrations come from the field of paraconsistent logic.

  [B11]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Reasoning about actions and obligations in first-order logic. Studia Logica, 57 (1): 221-237, 1996. ISSN 0039-3215. Available on-line

Abstract. We describe a new way in which theories about the deontic status of actions can be represented in terms of the standard two-sorted first-order extensional predicate calculus. Some of the resulting formal theories are easy to implement in Prolog; one prototype implementation--R. M. Lee's deontic expert shell DX--is briefly described.

  [B10]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. The first theory about hemispheric specialization: Fresh light on an old codex. Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 51 (3): 293-312, July 1996. ISSN 0022-5045. Available on-line

Abstract. This paper supersedes the author's "An ancient Greek theory of hemispheric specialization," Clio Medica 17 (1982) 33-38. It is argued that the ancient Greek theory about functional cerebral asymmetry discussed in that article can hardly have been put forward before the third century B. C. It should therefore not be attributed to Diocles of Carystus (fourth century B. C.).

  [B9]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Counting the minds of split-brain patients. Logique et Analyse, 39 (155-156): 316-324, 1996. ISSN 0024-5836. Available on-line

Abstract. Using Fagin's and Halpern's local reasoning models and an epistemic variant of Jennings's and Schotch's semantics of weakly aggregative modal logic, we argue that the hypothesis that split-brain patients have two coherent minds is preferable to the hypothesis that they have one incoherent mind.

  [B8]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Aristotle on reflective awareness. Logique et Analyse, 37 (146): 129-143, 1994. ISSN 0024-5836. Available on-line

Abstract. We present a logical reconstruction of Aristotle's views on reflective awareness (De Anima III.2, 425b12-25, and De Somno 2, 455a12-22).

  [B7]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Wittgenstein on the structure of the soul: A new interpretation of Tractatus 5.5421. Philosophical Investigations, 14 (4): 324-341, October 1991. ISSN 0190-0536. Reprinted in [A1]. Available on-line

Abstract. Tractatus 5.542-5.5421 should be read as follows: anything which represents is complex; the soul is simple; so `the superficial psychologists of the present day' are mistaken when claiming that the soul represents anything. In contrast to the `empirical self', with which psychology is concerned, the `metaphysical' or `transcendental' soul, subject, or self is a purely fictitious entity (or rather, non-entity) which does not have any positive function.

  [B6]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Multiply modal extensions of da Costa's Cn, logical relativism, and the imaginary. The Journal of Non-Classical Logic, 5 (2): 7-22, 1989. ISSN 0102-3411. Reprinted in [A1]. Available on-line

Abstract. How should our logic express what other logics deem necessary? How should we give a rational account of forms of rationality which are different from ours? The present paper answers these questions. It shows how to enrich logical systems with operators which describe what is necessary, rational and imaginary according to other systems. Although only Da Costa's paraconsistent calculi are treated in detail, the construction is generally applicable. As a result, the thesis of logical relativism--people from different cultures may live in different cognizable worlds--may henceforth be discussed in terms of modal logic and possible world semantics.

  [B5]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Ontology, semantics and philosophy of mind in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A formal reconstruction. Erkenntnis, 29: 35-75, 1988. ISSN 0165-0106. Reprinted in [A1]. Available on-line

Abstract. This paper presents a formal explication of Wittgenstein's early views on ontology, the syntax and semantics of an ideal logical language, and the propositional attitudes. It is shown that Wittgenstein gave a "language of thought" analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions and that his ontological views imply that such ascriptions are truth-functions of (and supervenient upon) elementary sentences. Finally, an axiomatization of a quantified doxastic modal logic corresponding to Tractarian semantics is given.

  [B4]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. The modal status of antinomies. The Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 29 (1): 102-105, 1988. ISSN 0029-4527. Reprinted in [A1]. Available on-line

Abstract. In order to study the modal status of antinomies (provable contradictions), we present two modal extensions of the antinomic calculus proposed by F.G. Asenjo and J. Tamburino in their "Logic of antinomies," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 16 (1975), pp. 17-44. Both systems are proved to be absolutely consistent and to be sound and complete with respect to certain Kripke-style models. It is shown that antinomies are both necessary and impossible in any case. They are provably contingent as well when serial accessibility relations between possible worlds are assumed.

  [B3]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Hemisphere differences before 1800. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8 (4): 642, 1985. ISSN 0140-525X. Available on-line
  [B2]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. The oldest printed text on hemispheric specialization. Neurology, 32: 762, July 1982. ISSN 0028-3878. Superseded by [B10].
  [B1]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. An ancient Greek theory of hemispheric specialization. Clio Medica, 17 (1): 33-38, 1982. ISSN 0045-7183. Superseded by [B10].

Chapters in Books

  [C8]
G.J.C. Lokhorst & M. J. van den Hoven. Statues and robots on trial: From robot ethics to roboethics. Forthcoming, 2012.
  [C7]
G.J.C. Lokhorst & M. J. van den Hoven. Responsibility for military robots. In P. Lin, K. Abney, & G. A. Bekey, eds., Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics, pp. 145-156. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2012. ISBN 978-0-262-01666-7.
  [C6]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Mens rea, logic and the brain. In Michael Freeman, ed., Law and Neuroscience (Current Legal Issues 2010 Volume 13), pp. 29-39. Oxford University Press, 2011. ISBN 978-0-19-959984-4.
  [C5]
M. J. L. Degenaar & G.J.C. Lokhorst. The Molyneux problem. In S. J. Savonius-Wroth, P. Schuurman, & J. Walmsley, eds., The Continuum Companion to Locke, pp. 179-183. Continuum, London and New York, 2010. ISBN 978-0826428110.
  [C4]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Ethical and social aspects of neuro-centred interface design. In Ira van Keulen, ed., Brain Visions, pp. 218-222. STT Netherlands Study Centre for Technology Trends, The Hague, 2008. ISBN 978-90-809613-6-4.
  [C3]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. "Antonius Deusing (1612-1666)", "Abraham Jacob Drijfhout (1733-1765)", and "Gerrit Willem van Oosten de Bruyn (1727-1797)". In Wiep van Bunge, Henri Krop, Bart Leeuwenburgh, Han van Ruler, & Paul Schuurman, eds., The Dictionary of Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century Dutch Philosophers. Thoemmes Press, Bristol, 2003. Available on-line
  [C2]
M. J. van den Hoven & G.J.C. Lokhorst. Deontic logic and computer-supported computer ethics. In James H. Moor & Terrell Ward Bynum, eds., CyberPhilosophy: The Intersection of Philosophy and Computing, pp. 280-289. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford (UK) and Malden MA (USA), 2002. ISBN 1-40510-073-7. Reprint of [B17].
  [C1]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Rudolf Carnap / Hector-Neri Castañeda. In J. de Mul, ed., Eric Claus: Twenty-one Twentieth-Century Philosophers in Bronze, p. 60 / 84. Stichting Lieve, Baarn, 1999. Available on-line

Papers in Conference Proceedings

  [D12]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Neuroethics and the extended mind thesis. In Martina Fürst, Wolfgang Gombocz, & Christian Hiebaum, eds., Gehirne und Persone, Beiträge zum 8. Internationalen Kongress der Oesterreichischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie in Graz, Band 1, pp. 363-366. Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt etc., 2009. ISBN 978-3-86838-014-9.
  [D11]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Ernst Mally's deontic logic (Graz 1926). In Martina Fürst, Wolfgang Gombocz, & Christian Hiebaum, eds., Analysen, Argumente, Ansätze, Beiträge zum 8. Internationalen Kongress der Oesterreichischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie in Graz, Band 2, pp. 31-34. Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt etc., 2009. ISBN 978-3-86838-015-6.
  [D10]
V. Wiegel, M. J. van den Hoven, & G.J.C. Lokhorst. Privacy, deontic epistemic action logic and software agents. In Ethics of New Information Technology, Proceedings CEPE2005, CTIT workshop proceedings. Enschede, 2005.
  [D9]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. From Petri nets to deontic logic. In J. L. Fiadeiro & P.-Y. Schobbens, eds., Proceedings of the Second Workshop of the ModelAge Project, pp. 167-180. Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências, Departamento de Informática, Lisboa, January 1996. Superseded by [F3].
  [D8]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Deontic linear logic on Petri nets. In J.-J. Ch. Meyer & L. C. van der Gaag, eds., NAIC '96: Proceedings of the 8th Dutch Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 277-282. Utrecht University, Utrecht, 1996. Superseded by [F3].
  [D7]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Modelling the deontic logic of action in first-order logic. In J. C. Bioch & Y.-H. Tan, eds., NAIC '95: Proceedings of the 7th Dutch Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 361-370. Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, 1995. Superseded by [B11].
  [D6]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Extensional deontic logics of action and their implementation. In A. J. I. Jones & M. Sergot, eds., Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 94), vol. 1/94 of CompLex, pp. 145-164. Tano, Oslo, 1993. ISBN 82-518-3200-4. Superseded by [B11].
  [D5]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Counting minds. In R. Casati & G. White, eds., Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences: Papers of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium, pp. 301-306. Die Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft, Kirchberg am Wechsel, 1993. Superseded by [B9].
  [D4]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Analog automata and the foundations of cognitive science. In Abstracts of the 9th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3, p. 99. Uppsala University, Uppsala, August 1991. Available on-line
  [D3]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Supervenience and truth-functionality in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. In P. Weingartner & G. Schurz, eds., Philosophy and Natural Science: Borderline Questions. Reports of the 13th International Wittgenstein Symposium, pp. 276-278. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna, 1989. ISBN 3-209-00862-0. Reprinted in [A1]. Available on-line

Abstract. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, I want to point out that Wittgenstein's Tractatus contains a clear and remarkably modern example of a theory of supervenience. And secondly, I want to argue that this theory of supervenience may be interpreted as a weak form of a principle of truth-functionality--which may exactly be the form of this principle which Wittgenstein himself had in mind.

  [D2]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Intelligence and the brain. In The Nature of Intelligence. Essays by Joseph Weizenbaum, Albert Visser, Gert-Jan Lokhorst and Monica Meijsing, followed by a transcript of the panel discussion after the film of Piet Hoenderdos, "Victim of the Brain". Studium Generale Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, 1988. Available on-line
  [D1]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. A formalization of Wittgenstein's early theory of belief. In R. M. Chisholm, J. Chr. Marek, J. T. Blackmore, & A. Hübner, eds., Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Psychology: Proceedings of the 9th International Wittgenstein Symposium, pp. 450-452. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna, 1985. ISBN 3-209-00592-3. Superseded by [B5].

Book Reviews

  [E8]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Review of S. Shoemaker, Physical Realization (Oxford University Press, 2007). Metapsychology Online Reviews, 12 (22), 2008. ISSN 1931-5716.
  [E7]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Review of S. Blackmore, Conversations on Consciousness (Oxford University Press, 2006). Metapsychology Online Reviews, 12 (11), 2008. ISSN 1931-5716.
  [E6]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Review of G. Rizzolatti and C. Sinigaglia, Mirrors in the Brain: How our Minds Share Actions, Emotions, and Experience (Oxford University Press, 2008). Metapsychology Online Reviews, 12 (23), 2008. ISSN 1931-5716.
  [E5]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Review of N. Georgalis, The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2005). Metapsychology Online Reviews, 11 (34), 2007. ISSN 1931-5716.
  [E4]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Review of Julius Rocca, Galen on the Brain: Anatomical Knowledge and Physiological Speculation in the Second Century AD (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2003). Journal for the History of the Neurosciences, 2003. ISSN 0964-704X. Available on-line
  [E3]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Review of Axel Karenberg and Christian Leitz, eds., Heilkunde und Hochkultur I: Geburt, Seuche und Traumdeutung in den antiken Zivilisationen des Mittelmeerraumes (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2000, ISBN 3-8258-5217-2), and Heilkunde und Hochkultur II: "Magie und Medizin" und "Der alte Mensch" in den antiken Zivilisationen des Mittelmeerraumes (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2002, ISBN 3-8258-5752-2). Journal for the History of the Neurosciences, 2003. ISSN 0964-704X. Available on-line
  [E2]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Review of Terrell Ward Bynum and James H. Moor, eds., The Digital Phoenix: How Computers are Changing Philosophy (Oxford (UK) and Malden MA (USA), Blackwell Publishers, 1998; ISBN 0-631-20352-4; 412 pp.). Ethics and Information Technology, 1 (1): 71-75, 1999. ISSN 1388-1957 (Paper) 1572-8439 (Online). Available on-line
  [E1]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Review of P. J. Koehler, Het localisatieconcept in de neurologie van Brown-Séquard. Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 64: 316-318, 1990. ISSN 0007-5140. Available on-line

Technical Reports

  [F4]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Ethics of medical imaging. Technical report, TU Delft, for NWO/STW, Delft, 2007. In preparation.
  [F3]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Deontic linear logic with Petri net semantics. Technical report, FICT (Center for the Philosophy of Information and Communication Technology), Rotterdam, 1997. Available on-line

Abstract. Deontic logic is the logic of obligation, permission and prohibition. Linear logic is a resource conscious logic which is well-known within computer science. Petri nets are models of concurrent dynamic processes which have been used in hundreds of applications. In this paper, we present a deontic linear system with Petri net semantics. This system has two advantages over modal and relevantist deontic logic: (1) it is free from many of the so-called "paradoxes" which plague the latter approaches; (2) its semantics are related to modelling techniques which are actually used in practice.

  [F2]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Individuating epistemic agents: An essay in the logic of distributed reasoning. Technical Report 1993-08-02, EURIDIS (Erasmus University Research Institute for Decision and Information Systems), Rotterdam, 1993. 11 pp. Superseded by [B9].
  [F1]
G.J.C. Lokhorst. Extensional deontic logics and their implementation. Technical Report 1993-08-01, EURIDIS (Erasmus University Research Institute for Decision and Information Systems), Rotterdam, 1993. 34 pp. Superseded by [B11].

Edited Volume

  [G1]
H.-N. Castañeda. Intentionality, Modality and Supervenience, vol. 13 of Rotterdamse Filosofische Studies. Faculteit der Wijsbegeerte, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Rotterdam, 1990. ISBN 90-70116-58-8. 95 pp. Edited by M.J. van den Hoven and G.J.C. Lokhorst. Available on-line

Abstract. This book contains the following three previously unpublished essays by Hector-Neri Castañeda: (1) Quine's experiment with intensional objects and his existentialist quantified modal logic; (2) Supervenient properties, emergence, and the hierarchy of concrete individuals; (3) Indexical reference and causal diagrams in intentional action. It also contains a bibliography of Castañeda's philosophical publications from 1986 to 1990.


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